.. a hierarchy of theories which have already been intensively studied in the literature. Ideally one would like to separate these systems. However this is generally expected to be a very deep problem, closely related to some of the most famous open problems in complexity theory.
In order to throw some light on the separation problems, I consider the case where the underlying language is enriched by extra relations and function symbols. The paper introduces a new type of results. These state that the first three levels in the hierarchy (i.e. S 2 ) are never able to distinguish (in a precise sense) the "finite" from the "infinite". The fourth level (i.e. T 2 2 ) in some cases can make such a distinction. More precisely, elementary principles from finitistical combinatorics (when expressed solely by the extra relation and function symbols) are only provable on the first three levels if they are valid when considered as principles of general (infinitistical) combinatorics. I show that this does not hold for the fourth level.
All results are proved by forcing.
Bounded Arithmetic
The discovery of abstract set theory was like the discovery of the outer space. Set theory provides us with a telescope and has undoubtly affected the general view of the mathematical universe.
We want the least number principle to be true for the formula ψ k (x). This is done by "forcing" ψ k (a) to be true for the smallest possible a, i.e. by letting f(a + 13) be even for the smallest value a where this is consistent with the fact that f is a 1-1 map. The conditions a has to satisfy can be expressed in the language L without reference tof . So in M we are able to search for such an a by a simple search procedure, which only depends on how f has already been defined on A. From an outside view "<" does not well order M, so for a moment we take a look at things from inside M. From this perspective "<" is a well ordering (this is possible because there are fewer sets in M than in the real universe). So the search procedure must terminate with some output a. Observers whether inside or outside M, always agree on first order properties, in this case, whether a actually is the smallest such element. Now go back to the real world outside M and proceed to the next step where the formula ψ k+1 (x) is considered. Again we force ψ k+1 (a) to be true for the smallest possible a. Alternatively if we cannot force ψ k+1 (a) to be true for any a we know it will never be true (even at doomsday when f is constructed for all formulas).
We must ensure that f eventually defines the required bijection. In the present construction this automatically happens. For instance, for each a ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} the formula ψ(x) := ∃yf(x) = y ∧ x = a eventually forces a to belong to {1, 2, ..., n} (if it does not already do so). The other properties follow for similar reasons. Now let Σ be any consistent theory. According to Skolem-Löwenheims theorem, Σ has a countable model S. If this model is infinite we assume that N is the underlying set. If we in the above construction start off by choosing a countable non-standard model (M, S M ) elementarily equivalent to (N, S), we get a model of existential induction in which Σ has a finite (in the sense of M) model. Thus we have shown:
Proposition 2.0.1 Any consistent theory Σ has a model S, which is embedded as a finite (=bounded) set in some model M.
Actually suppose that L is a countable language which extend the language of arithmetic, and suppose that L contains undefined relation and function symbols for the language of Σ. Then the model M can be chosen such that it satisfies the induction scheme for existential L-formulas.
This shows that any structure S, for example structures of strong systems like set theory, can be embedded as "finite" sets in some super-structure. It also shows that we can always assume that a given mathematical domain is "finite" given that our meta-theory (falsely) believes that all sets (and maps etc) in the universe are purely existentially defined.
As the pigeon-hole principle fails for infinite sets, as a corollary we obtain theorem 21 [12] :
Corollary 2.0.2 (A.Wilkie, J.Paris) The system I∃(f) does not prove that f satisfies the pigeon-hole principle.
The results in this paper resemble the ideas just described. However we need to be more careful.
It follows from the main results that countable structures can always be assumed to be (up to elementarily equivalence) finite in certain fragments of Bounded Arithmetic. As we have already indicated this phenomenon is closely related to the fact that the pigeon-hole principle fails heavily in these fragments. And it illustrates the microscope metaphor. One just has to look through the microscope from the right end!
Prelims
First let me recall some basic notations and facts, essentially all from [4] . Let BASIC denote a finite set of quantifier free formulas relating constants, functions and relations in the first order language L = L(0, 1, +, ·, | · |, ,
, ≤, =). Here denotes the function given by a b = 2 |a|·|b| where |a| = log 2 (a + 1) . An example of a proper choice of BASIC (without coding functions) can be found in [4] . It is convenient to add other functions to the language. We will assume that a function (w) x which takes the value of the x th element in the sequence coded by w is part of the language.
As long as additional functions are polynomially time computable, the results in this section can be stated with no change. In the first order case atomic formulas are of the form t = s or t ≤ s where s, t are terms in L, while in the (monadic) second order case additionally, atomic formulas can be of the form t ∈ X or X = 2 Y . (Where "= 2 " denotes equality between second order variables.)
A 
The first order theories
Let S i 2 denote the first order theory consisting of BASIC, together with the following "polynomial time" induction scheme, ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ( 
The second order theories
The (monadic) second order versions of these theories
We do not allow the full comprehension axiom, but follow [6] and equip S i 2 (α) (T i 2 (α)) with the following "NP ∩ co-NP"comprehension axiom-scheme:
The underlying logic of these theories is second order predicate logic with second order equality = 2 . It is easy to prove that no deductive strength is lost if X = 2 Y is taken to be short-hand notation for ∀z(z ∈ X ↔ z ∈ Y ), and if EXT and the equality axioms in the underlying logic are dropped.
Models of second order theories
A model of a second order theory T is a pair (M,R), whereR ⊆ P (M), the power set of M, and where M is a model for the first order part of T . The satisfaction relation |= is defined inductively such that second order variables are taken to be the subsets of M which are inR. The well known main advantage of using this notion of a model, without requiring thatR = P (M), is that the Compactness Theorem, the Completeness Theorem and Skolem-Löwenheims Theorems hold with minor changes. 
From this we get the following version of the Completeness Theorem.
Proposition 3.3.2 T ∪ EXT is consistent if and only if T has a model.
T ∪ EXT φ if and only if (M,Ŝ) |= φ for all models (M,Ŝ) |= T.
Some special results for S i

(α)
Now I prove that the second order theories S Definition 3.4.1 By a Ψ-substitution scheme Σ we will understand a first order formula θ Σ with no second order variables, which contains meta-variables 
According to proposition 3.3.2 EXT holds in all second order models, in particular (M,Ŝ). BASIC holds in (M,Ŝ) because it is a set of first order formulas. It remains to be shown that (M,Ŝ) |= Σ and to show (M,Ŝ) |= ∆
Here η is obtained from ψ by the following. First, by replacing each appearance of
.., R r ) according to whether S i appears positively or negatively. Second, by bringing it in a "prenex like" form if convenient. Now sub claim 1 follows by noticing that
and that (M,R) |= Σ(η) is part of the assumption. 
Some conservation results
In [5] S.Buss gave a precise characterisation of the S The following immediately gives us the inclusions
) |b| " and by modus ponens and the fact the
M, and then by definition X has a smallest element. As Σ
In some later examples I will use one of the deeper theorems in the subject:
i . This follows again by relativising the proof of S.Buss' theorem stating that for
Some finitisation principles
One of our aims is to show that there is a fundamental difference between S 2 2 (α) and levels in the hierarchy which are at least as strong as T 2 2 (α). There is a general feeling amongst those working in Bounded Arithmetic that a proof of the non-finite axiomatisability of the first order theory S 2 (= T 2 ) would be of great importance. An important step in that direction would be to separate T These theorems show that when we pass from the real universe to an universe which only contains "feasible" sets, we have the heuristic translations, countable → finite, finite → poly-logarithmic.
Further definitions and assumptions
Let L 2 (0, 1, +, ·, f f ast , f slow , =, ≤) be a second order language where through some basic axioms f f ast and f slow are ensured to define functions such that f f ast is fastgrowing, and that f slow is slow growing. Further it is assumed that f slow is slower than f f ast is fast (!). More precisely assume:
(3 ) For any fixed k, for all sufficiently large n f slow (f 
and therefore | f slow (f
Clearly for any fixed k and non-standard n, | n | 2 k < n so the consideration below applies to the
Definition 4.1.3 Let < x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k > be a natural code of the k-tuple. For each k we introduce quantifiers ∀ k and ∃ k such that Q k x ψ(x) is shorthand notation for
For a relation symbol S, the formula θ S ( x) denotes the formula which appears if each quantifier in θ is restricted to S. By θ <a ( x) we understand the formula which appears by restricting each quantifier in θ to [0, a). ♣
A version of the completeness theorem
As I have already pointed out, in the real mathematical universe it is not true that any finite consistent set of first-order sentences has a finite model. But there are T 1 2 (α)-universes where such a strong form of the completeness theorem holds.
Theorem 4.2.1 (Finitisation principle) Let θ( R) be a first order property expressed in some relational languageL = L( R). Suppose that η(n) is an arithmetical first order property expressible in the language L of arithmetic and suppose that η(n) holds for arbitrary large n. If θ( R) has a model then the theory
First we shall make some preparation for the proof. LetL and θ( R) be given as in the theorem. We can assume that all relations are r-ary. θ( R) is assumed to have an infinite model, so by Skolem-Löwenheims Theorem, we can assume θ( R) has an infinite countable model S st on a subset of the natural numbers. Furthermore, we can assume S st is a model with an underlying co-countable set, and if convenient, that an extra unary relation symbol denoting membership of S st is added to the language. Let (M, S) be a countable non-standard model for the languageL(R) := L ∪L which is elementarily equivalent to the standard model (N, S st ). Use overspill to pick a non-standard number n such that M |= η(n).
Fix a non-standard number b 0 < n such that b k 0 < n for each standard number k, and such that f slow (f
f ast (n)) < b 0 for every standard number k. Use overspill to pick c ∈ M non-standard such that f slow (c) < b 0 and such that c > f
, and such that α maps points in [0, n) to S, and maps points in {n + 1, n + 2, ..., c} to M \ S.
Let P = ∪ k∈ω P k and let (P, ⊆) be P ordered under inclusion. ♣
Generic maps
Let us now make a few basic definitions:
} where R w is interpreted by ω. We allow θ to contain parameters from M. ♣ Notice that in [1] the similar notion (just called definable) is S = {x ∈ M | ∃n ∈ R w θ(x, n)}, which would not work in our case because we cannot force formulas in general to be equivalent to existential formulas. It should also be noticed that any extension of the notion of quasi-definability which does not produce uncountably many quasi-definable dense subsets of P, would work.
For every α 0 ∈ P ∃G ⊆ P generic such that α 0 ∈ G.
Proof: M is assumed to be countable so that there is at most countably many quasidefinable sets D ⊆ P. List those as
Sketch of proof
Now let me sketch the proof. We are given a non-standard model (M, S) ≡ e (N, S st ) in which the "structure" S we want to miniaturise is a part. We can assume that the language contains the language of arithmetic together with extra relations, denoting the relations in S.
First, it is shown that some (actually any) genericα is a bijection from [0, c) to M, mapping [0, n) onto S. At this stage we also have to show certain lemmas about the forcing relation in order to ensure it behaves well.
Second, it is shown that for some (actually any) generic mapα, (M,α) |= ∃ * −LNP, where ∃ * -LNP denotes the least number principle for formulas in which all quantifiers are either existential (positive appearance) or are restricted to [0, b 0 ). This part of the argument is based on the same idea as the proof of theorem 21 in [12] (see also the introduction). Third, it is noticed that the constants, relations and functions in the miniaturised structure S mini :=α −1 (S) are ∃ ∩ ∀-definable in the generic model (M,α).
Fourth, it is shown that each formula expressing a Σ 
The forcing relation
First we need to show some basic fact about generic maps. For simplicity we reduce logical constants. So suppose that ∀ :≡ ¬∃¬ and ∧ :≡ ¬ ∨ ¬. Extend the language with names for the elements in M. Also extend the languageL(R) by an extra binary relation symbolᾱ. For sentences in this languageL( R,ᾱ) we define the forcing relation inductively as follows:
α | ψ if ψ does not containᾱ, is atomic and true.
α | ᾱ(a, b) iff α(a) is defined and equals b.
The forcing relation for negation satisfies:
Soundness of the forcing relation
We have to make sure that the forcing relation satisfies certain key properties. Except for lemma 4.6.4 below, the reader who is familiar with forcing techniques could ignore this section. If (M,α) |= ¬ψ, by induction there cannot be α ∈ G such that α | ψ. By completeness there is α ∈ G such that α | ¬ψ.
If α | ¬ψ but (M,α) |= ψ for some generic mapα ⊇ α, there is β ∈ G such that β | ψ. By definition α and β have a common extension in P. By use of the extension and the consistency property we get a contradiction. P 
Proof: If ψ(x) is atomic and is of the form
, and let V
u, x and notice that Card(V
. Now we prove (2) and (3) 
Some properties of the generic objects
We have already defined ∃ * to be the set of formulas in which all quantifiers are either existential which appear positively or are restricted to [0, b 0 ) (Sharply bounded quantifiers). According to our plan in order to prove the main theorem we have to prove that some (any) genericα satisfies the ∃ * -LNP scheme. Let ∃ * Strict be the set of formulas ∃ xψ( x), where ψ ∈ Σ(b 0 ) and where there are no restrictions on the parameters in ψ. First we prove that: Proof: Let ψ(z) ≡ ∃ xψ 1 ( x, z) be given. (ψ 1 ∈ Σ(b 0 )). Let α 0 ∈ P k be given such that α 0 | ψ(a) for some a ∈ M. Let a 0 ∈ M be the smallest element such that for some β ⊇ α 0 with β ∈ P k+r (for suitable r), and some x 0 , β | ψ 1 ( x 0 , a 0 ) . This definition makes sense because the forcing relation is definable for Σ(b 0 )-formulas. (By lemma 4.6.4). Let D be the set of β ∈ P which are either incompatible to α 0 or extensions of a β with the property just mentioned above. D is quasi-definable and dense so there is α ∈ D ∩ G. Clearly α | ψ(a 0 ). All that remains is to check that if r is chosen properly (lemma 4.6.4) there is no a 1 < a 0 and α ⊃ α with α | ψ(a 1 ). P
A minor problem
Now we want to prove that for some (any) genericα, (M,α) actually satisfies the ∃ * -LNP scheme. It should be noticed that because of the presence of the generic objectα it is not entirely clear why any ∃ * -formula should be equivalent to an ∃ * Strict formula. Let ψ(z) be a given ∃ * -formula. Let us try to follow the same strategy as in the proof of lemma 4.7.1 above. Without loss of generality we can assume that 
Again if there is any z 0 satisfying the condition, there is also a smallest such z 0 . This holds for each choice of r ∈ ω. As a minor technical problem we need to show (what might be obvious to the reader) that if β is chosen as above, for no β ⊇ β we can have β | ψ(z 1 ) for some z 1 < z 0 . Now in general (M,α) has more definable functions on [0, b 0 ) than M. This is because for each formula θ(x, α) and each generic mapα, α could be eliminated (i.e. there was a formula ψ(x) such that
in the case where f slow (x) := log(x)), then induction would hold up to b 0 ≥ log(c) and therefore up to c, which would be a contradiction.
Essentially we have to check that ψ(z 1 ) can not have a sequence of witnesses which was not definable in M. In the case where ψ(x) was a ∃ * Strict -formula there was no such problem because the search in M was only a search for standard finitely many witnesses. We have to show that there cannot be such a z 1 . This is essentially done by showing that in the case of ∃ * -formulas for any genericα there is an M definable sequence of witnesses. For θ ∈ ∃ * we make the following definition:
Notice that for θ ∈ ∃ * if α | D θ for each extension (not necessarily a generic extension!)α of α then (M,α) |= θ.
Observation 4.8.2
For each α 0 ∈ P, each k ∈ ω and each ψ ∈ ∃ * the set {< α, x >:
The problem we are concerned with at this stage is whether it is possible for given α 0 and θ ∈ Σ(b 0 ) to have α ⊇ α 0 with α | ∀x ≤ b∃y θ(x, y) but for no
Assume that there is α ⊇ α 0 such that α | ∀x ≤ b 0 ∃y θ(x, y). Claim: There is an extension Proof: Let α 0 be given. Assume that for some α ⊇ α 0 ...
...θ( x, y). By induction on
Notice that Card(V ) ≤ b Proof: Letα be an arbitrary generic map. We need to show that (M,α) |= ∃xψ(x) ⇒ ∃x 0 ≤ x∀z < x 0 ψ(x 0 ) ∧ ¬ψ(z). Suppose (M,α) |= ψ(a) for some a ∈ M (otherwise there is nothing to prove). According to the completeness property there is α 0 ⊆α such that α 0 ∈ P and α 0 | ψ(a).
From what has already been proved it follows that D is well defined, dense and quasidefinable. For any generic G ⊆ P there are α 1 ∈ D ∩ G. By lemma 4.8.3 for anỹ β ⊇ α (in particularα ) (M,β) |= ∃xψ(x) ⇒ ∃x 0 ≤ x∀z < x 0 ψ(x 0 ) ∧ ¬ψ(z). As α 1 ⊆α we are done. P
Proof of the first finitisation principle
The previous section has given us a "generic model" (M,α) which satisfies the ∃ * -LNP scheme. Clearlyα induces a miniaturised version of S on [0, n). Constants, relations and functions on S correspond to constants, relations and functions on [0, n). Now I prove the important fact that all the miniaturised relations etc. are ∃ ∩ ∀-definable in (M,α).
For each relation R ⊆ S r (with quantifier-free definition in M), we define the corresponding miniaturised relation R mini "existentially" by:
Notice that R mini also has a "universal" definition:
Add the miniaturised relations to the language. Consider the sub-language L mini which contains L and names for the miniaturised constants, relations and functions. Notice that our results hold in the special case where T 1 (α) is the second order theory which consists of 1) Induction for existential formulas.
2) The ∀ ∩ ∃-comprehension axiom scheme. Proof: The first part of the theorem has already been proven. It follows from the examples below that the second part holds at least for some constructions (i.e. for some S). To prove the second part let U(x) be a new unary predicate symbol which holds exactly in one component of S. Let U mini denote the corresponding predicate in L mini . Put f slow :=| x | and f f ast := x |x| . Consider the formula
Clearly A(k) is valid for all standard k and hence, by overspill, A(z) holds for some non-standard z (and z ≤| n |). But this is a contradiction as for any given interval of length < b ω the set of α ∈ P such that α maps an element of S \ U into it, is dense and quasi-definable. This is a new proof of the result which was first proved in [8] .
Some examples Example 6.0.5 Fix p ≥ 2. There is an infinite model A where "R defines a partition of A into disjoint p-subsets". Let η(n) ≡ "n is not divisible by p'.
According to the first principle T 1 (α) Count(p).
In [2] and [16] it is shown that this holds for much stronger theories.
Example 6.0.6 According to the first principle:
every linear ordering R (of a finite set) has an isolated point".
(2) T 1 (α) "every linear ordering R (of a finite set) is discrete".
every linear ordering R (of a finite set) is a well ordering".
By the results below in all cases
Notice that example 6.0.6 shows (using T 1 2 (α) ≡ WOA, Proposition 8.0.9) that the well ordering axiom for arbitrary linear orderings (WOA * ) R does not follow from WOA.
Another principle
The second finitisation principle says that for any given r ∈ N if some second order existential relational propertyP ≡ P ( R, X) is only witnessed by infinite sets (in the real universe), there are models of T 1 2 (α) in which there is an n and relations R ⊆ [0, n) such that no subset X ⊆ [0, n) with size ≤ log r 2 (n) witness P ( R, X).
Theorem 7.0.7 (Finitisation principle) Let θ ≡ ∃Xψ( R, X) be a second order existential formula where ψ is a first order formula in the language L( R, X, =). Let k ∈ N be a given natural number. In general (1) implies (2): (1) There is a countable model S of the language L( R, =), such that for no finite set X ⊆ S, S |= ψ( R, X).
This principle states that if a second order existential property has (in the real universe) a countable model where the existential quantifier is not finitely witnessed then it is consistent with T 1 2 (α) (and by the results below S 2 2 (α)) that there is a finite model where the existential quantifiers is not "polylog"-witnessed. Proof: Proved by a construction very similar to the proof of the first finitisation principle. Pick S according to (1) The well ordering axiom (WOA) is the principle:
WOA says that "<" well orders any set X, and should not be confused with the stronger principle WOA * stating that any linear ordering of a bounded set is a well ordering. There is R ∈Ŝ such that R = ∅ and such that (M,Ŝ) |= ∀y(y ∈ R ⇒ ∃z < y z ∈ R). As R = ∅ there is u 0 ∈ R such that: holds. Let (M, S large , R large ) be an elementary equivalent (in a language expanded by relation symbols for R large and S large ) non-standard model. Let n ∈ M be a nonstandard number, and let I * ⊆ M be the initial sequent defined by 
is forced true for all Σ 
In general after stage j we have constructed
The points in U j are very sparsely distributed in the sense that ∀u 1 = u 2 ∈ U j | u 2 − u 1 |≥ e j . Now consider < θ j+1 (x), a j+1 >. Our aim is to force
, ... for r ≤ log(a j+1 ) . Now for each u ∈ [d j , e j ] define the number l(u) ∈ M as the largest number (≤ log(a j+1 )) such that there are extensions
) are forced true. contrarily that for some k ∈ ω in the generic model we have
In stage k in the construction we have forced a maximum number of the Σ
., θ k (0) true. As obviously θ k (a k ) cannot have been forced true, there must be j < log(a k ) such that θ k (a 
Lifting the finitisation principles
Now I show that both finitisation principles for T 
Add an extra constantn, extra function symbolsF 1 ,F 2 , ..,F k and an extra relational symbolR to the language. Call this languageL 2 . The first order theory T
As a skolemisation of θ implies θ (even in pure predicate logic) this contradicts our initial assumption about S The following were proved in [10] . Above we have obtained a new proof of the second part of the theorem. Proof: The second part of the theorem has already been proved. The first part follows from the fact that S Proof: A careful analysis of the S 2 -proof in [12] (see also [8] ) of WPHP shows that the proof is actually a S 
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Some applications
By use of the second finitisation principle we get the following theorem. The last case (3) shows that the theorem is not entirely a curiosity. (1)- (2) .
At present, it is not known whether T 2 2 (α) (3) . A proof of even S 2 (α) (3) would have interesting consequences. (See [13] and [10] for more details). Proof: The first part of the theorem follows from the second finitisation principle (in case (1) from a slightly modified version of the principle) and the facts:
There is an (infinite) vector space with no finite basic.
There is an (infinite) binary tree with no finite branch.
There is an (infinite) irreflexively oriented graph with no finite dominating set.
To prove the last part of the theorem, assume V is a vector space on [0, n) with no coded basic. Pick independent vectors v 1 , v 2 , ..., v log(2n) +1 and get a ∆ path x 1 , x 2 , ..., x r from the root to x, and bit(y, j) = 1 ↔ x j is a right son. Again we get a contradiction to the WPHP in [11] . P
